The central issue between the laboratory and the
manufacturing divisions was who was going decide, and pay
for, experimental and development work. The
divisional policy required purchase orders for every service
performed the laboratory and the years after 1915 were
marked interdivisional squabbles over who should pay for the
lab's work. The divisions wanted to
know how much their money was being spent, and what. (This kind of
complaint was not new Edison; had been answering charges
like this since managed machine shops Newark.XII-25
For much the work the laboratory, billing (and turn
financing) did not present problem. Testing, tool-making,
pattern-making, drafting and other engineering support the
manufacturing branch were clearly identified and accounted for.) The
division manager had keep his eye the bottom line and
therefore resisted spending R&D. This involved high-risk research, perhaps develop a
totally new product discover completely new way of
making product. the other hand, the
laboratory had charge even the smallest job purchase
order— and somebody had pay it.
It was the more general basic research that was harder to
finance. demanded long-term commitment funds
and resources, and tighter corporate structure which
division managers had watch their costs very closely, was
sometimes hard justify the expense experimental work. The divisions often claimed that they had been
c n
billed for work done for other people.
